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ABSTRACT
Transfer learning is widely used for transferring knowledge from a
source domain to the target domain where the labeled data is scarce.
Recently, deep transfer learning has achieved remarkable progress
in various applications. However, the source and target datasets
usually belong to two different organizations in many real-world
scenarios, potential privacy issues in deep transfer learning are
posed. In this study, to thoroughly analyze the potential privacy
leakage in deep transfer learning, we first divide previous methods
into three categories. Based on that, we demonstrate specific threats
that lead to unintentional privacy leakage in each category. Addi-
tionally, we also provide some solutions to prevent these threats.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to provide a
thorough analysis of the information leakage issues in deep transfer
learning methods and provide potential solutions to the issue. Ex-
tensive experiments on two public datasets and an industry dataset
are conducted to show the privacy leakage under different deep
transfer learning settings and defense solution effectiveness.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Software and application secu-
rity; • Computing methodologies→ Transfer learning.
ACM Reference Format:
Cen Chen, Bingzhe Wu, Minghui Qiu, Li Wang, Jun Zhou. 2018. A Com-
prehensive Analysis of Information Leakage in Deep Transfer Learning.
In KDD’20. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/
1122445.1122456
1 INTRODUCTION
Transfer learning is a rapidly growing field of machine learning that
aims to improve the learning of a data-deficient task by knowledge
transfer from related data-sufficient tasks [27, 35, 40]. Witness the
success of deep learning, deep transfer learning has been widely
studied and demonstrated remarkable performance over various
applications, such as medical image classification [28], electronic
health data analysis[5], and credit modeling [33].
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A fundamental block of deep transfer learning is deep neural
network, which is vulnerable to different attacks aiming to detect
sensitive information contained in the training dataset [7, 32, 37].
Moreover, in most of the real-world applications where deep trans-
fer learning is used, the source and target datasets always reside
in two different organizations. As a result, deep transfer learning
also faces potential privacy threats, i.e, the client in the target or-
ganization can leverage the vulnerability of deep learning models
to detect sensitive information contained in the source organiza-
tion. Specifically, applying deep transfer learning comes with the
interaction between the source and target domains. Thus, the data
transmission between these domains may unintentionally disclose
private information.
Existing studies on analyzing privacy leakages focus on either
general machine learning models [25, 32] or in a federated learning
setting where model is collaboratively trained by multiple clients by
sharing and aggregating the gradients via a server[22, 25]. However,
there no such study on transfer learning paradigms. To this end, we
are the first to provide a general categorization for deep transfer
learning models based on the potential information leakages. This
is not trivial since there are numerous methods for deep transfer
learning [27, 35, 40]. Given the goal of privacy leakage analysis,
we care more about the interaction manner between source and
target domains. Thus, we divide previous works into three cate-
gories, as illustrated in Figure 1: (1) model-based paradigm where
the whole model structure and parameters are shared (2) mapping-
based where the hidden features are shared (3) parameter-based
where the parameter gradients are shared. Based on that, the previ-
ous works can fall into the above categories or a hybrid of them.
For example, fine-tuning based approaches obviously belong to the
first category. The prior work [34] is based on the mapping-based
paradigm, since it uses the correlation alignment loss which further
depends on the shared hidden features. Similarly, previous works
that minimize the domain representation difference by variants of
distribution divergence metrics such as maximum mean discrep-
ancy also fall into the second category [17, 18, 29]. Fully-shared
and shared-private transfer learning models [15] can be regarded
as parameter-based, as they both jointly train a shared network via
gradient updates in a multi-task fashion, just to name a few.
Based on the general categorization, we can build customized at-
tacks against each paradigm and demonstrate information leakages
in deep transfer learning. At a high level, we consider inferring
two types of sensitive information, i.e., membership and property
information. This sensitive information can be revealed by the
transmission data between the two domains as the above discussed.
Specifically, in the model-based paradigm, we build the membership
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Figure 1: An illustration ofmodel-based,mapping-based and parameter-based transfer learning paradigms.DS andDT denote
the source domain and target domain data, respectively. Each dataset contains a set of labeled training samples that consist of
the inputs x and their corresponding labels y. We usew to denote model parameters, and h for feature representations.
attack which takes the model (learned using the source dataset) as
input and determines whether a specific sample is used for training
the model. In the mapping-based setting, we can build the property
attack to infer properties contained in the training dataset. For
example, the attacker resides on the target domain aims to infer
properties of the source domain based on the shared hidden fea-
tures. In the parameter-based setting, we can similarly perform the
property inference attack, i.e., the attacker can infer properties of
the source domain data based on the shared gradients. More details
of these attacks can be found in Section 3.
Empirically, to demonstrate the effectiveness of attacks, we con-
duct a set of experiments under the three types of transfer learning
settings. Our key observation is that all these types of models do
unintentionally leak information of the training data under mem-
bership/property attacks. Model-based paradigm is possible to leak
membership information. Parameter-based paradigm without re-
vealing individual gradient (i.e., averaged gradients at batch-level)
leaks much less property information, compared to the mapping-
based paradigm where hidden features (i.e., representations at
sample-level) are shared.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We are the first to propose a general categorization for differ-
ent deep transfer learning paradigms based on their intrinsic
interaction manner between the source and target domains
and provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential pri-
vacy leakage profiles for each category respectively.
• Based on the categorization, we build specific attacks against
each paradigm to demonstrate their privacy leakages.
• In contrast to previous works that aim to design privacy-
preserving transfer learning model for a specific setting (e.g.,
mapping-based [16, 31]), our analysis has covered a wide
range of deep transfer learning methods.
• We conduct extensive experiments on both public datasets
and an industry marketing dataset to verify the effectiveness
of our attacks and defense solutions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Deep Transfer Learning Setting
In this work, we focus on deep transfer learning [35, 40], where the
models discussed are neural network based. Without losing gener-
ality, we consider a transfer learning setting with two domain tasks
T ∈ {S,T }, where S and T refer to the source domain and target
domain respectively, both containing private sensitive information.
We aim to improve the target domain learning task performance by
utilizing its own dataDT and source domain dataDS . Each dataset
contains a set of labeled examples zi = (xi ,yi ), where x denotes the
inputs and y denotes the corresponding labels. The size of source
domain data DS is usually much larger than the target domain
data DT , i.e., N S >> NT . The goal of a domain task is to learning
a transformation function fw (x, y) : Rd → R, parameterized by
model weights w.
2.2 Inference Attacks for DNN Models
The basic idea of the inference attack is to exploit the leakages when
amodel is being trained or released to reveal some unintended infor-
mation from the training data. In this section, we briefly present two
types of inference attacks, i.e., membership and property attacks,
for machine learning models.
Membership Inference Attack.Membership inference is a typi-
cal attack that aims to determine whether a sample is used as part
of the training dataset. Membership inference may reveal sensitive
information that leads to privacy breach. For example, if we can
infer a patient’s existence in the training dataset for a medical study
of a certain disease, we can probably claim that this patient has
such a disease. Recent works have demonstrated the membership
attack attempts for machine learning models under the black-box
setting [19, 30, 32], white-box setting [22, 26] or both [9]. Shadow
training is a widely adopted technique for membership inference,
where multiple shadow models are trained to mimic the behavior
of the target model[19, 30, 32]. This technique assumes the attacker
to have some prior knowledge about the population from the tar-
geted model training dataset was drawn. Recent works by [22, 26]
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explicitly exploit the vulnerabilities in gradient updates to perform
attacks with white-box access.
Property Inference Attack. Another common type of attack is
property inference that aims to reveal certain unintended or sen-
sitive properties (e.g., the fraction of the data belongs to a certain
minority group) of the participating training datasets that the model
producer does not intend to share when the model is released. A
property is usually uncorrelated or loosely correlated with the main
training task. Pioneer works of [2, 6, 7] conducted the property at-
tacks that characterize the entire training dataset. While, [22] aimed
to infer properties for a subset of the training inputs, i.e., in terms
of single batches which they termed as single-batch properties. In
this regard, membership attack can be viewed as a special case of
property attack when scope for property attack is on a sample basis.
The above-mentioned two types of attacks are closely related.
Most of existing works perform those attacks against general ma-
chine learning models, while a few focus on the federated learning
and collaborative learning scenarios [22, 26]. None of the stud-
ies systematically explore the inference attacks explicitly for the
context of deep transfer learning.
3 PRIVACY LEAKAGE IN DEEP TRANSFER
LEARNING
In this section, we first provide a general categorization of deep
transfer learning according to the interaction manner between
source and target domains. Then, based on the categorization, we
conduct privacy analysis through building specific attacks against
different transfer learning paradigms.
3.1 General Categorization of Deep Transfer
Learning
Different types of transfer learning models have been proposed over
the years, depending on how the knowledge is shared. Although in
transfer learning, there may exist several existing categorizations
in the literature [25, 27, 35], we categorize the different deep transfer
learning models based on how the two domains interact, their training
strategy (e.g., co-training or self-training), and the potential leakages.
Broadly speaking, those transfer learningmodels can be categorized
into three types, i.e., model-based, mapping-based, and parameter-
based, as illustrated in Figure 1.
• Model-based (in Figure 1(a)) is a simple but effective transfer
learning paradigm, where the pre-trained source domain
model is used as the initialization for continued training on
the target domain data. Model-based fine-tuning has been
broadly used to reduce the number of labeled data needed
for learning new tasks/tasks of new domains [4, 10, 11].
• Mapping-based (in Figure 1(b)) methods aim to align the
hidden representations by explicitly reducing the marginal
or conditional distribution divergence between source and
target domains. More specifically, alignment losses, i.e., usu-
ally in forms of distribution discrepancies/distance metrics
such as MMD and JMMD, between domains are measured
by such feature mapping approaches and minimized in the
loss functions [17, 18, 29].
• Parameter-based (in Figure 1(c)) methods transfer knowledge
by jointly updating a shared partial network to learn transfer-
able feature representations across domains in a multi-task
fashion. This type of methods is mainly achieved by param-
eter sharing. Regardless of the design differences, they all
utilize a shared network structure to transform the input data
into domain-invariant hidden representations [15, 38, 39].
Based on the general categorization, we will discuss the threat
model, information leakage and the customized attacks against
each transfer learning paradigm in detail.
3.2 Threat Model
In this work, we assume all the parties , i.e., the domain-specific data
owners, are semi-honest, where they follow exactly the computation
protocols but may try to infer as much information as possible when
interacting with the other parties. More specifically, we work on
the threat model under a deep transfer learning setting with two
domains. Without loss of generality, we assume the owner of the
target dataset to be the attacker, who intentionally attempts to
infer additional information from source domain data beyond what
is explicitly revealed. Depending on the different deep transfer
learning categorizations, the attacker may have different access to
the source domain information. Note that we can naturally extend
to the case where the attacker is the owner of the source dataset
or the transfer learning setting with more than two data sources,
however, it is not the focus of this paper.
3.3 Privacy Analysis
As presented in Table 1, three types of model categorization require
different information interactions and training strategies, thus pos-
ing different potential leakage profiles. More specifically:
• Model-based methods rely on the pre-trained source domain
model solely. Despite the necessity for a pre-trained model to
be disclosed to the target domain, both the source and target
training processes can be entirely separately, thus the poten-
tial leakage is only the final source domain model
〈
MS
〉
. In
this case, the attacker has full access to the source domain
model including both the model structure and parameters.
• Mapping-based methods are optimized in a co-training fash-
ion and hidden presentations of both domains have to inter-
act with each other to measure the alignment losses or do-
main regularizers.We denotehSik andh
T
ik as the hidden repre-
sentation of layer i at a training iteration k ∈ [1, 2, ...,K] for
source and target domains, respectively. Specifically, such a
feature matching process demands the hidden presentations,
i.e., hSik and h
T
ik , of both domains to be exposed and aligned
to reduce the marginal or conditional distribution divergence
between domains. As a result,
〈
hS ,hT
〉
can potentially leak
information from the training data.
• Parameter-based methods jointly updating the shared partial
network. The interactions between the source and target
happen when exchanging the gradients to sync the shared
network parameters. Letwck denote themodel parameters for
the shared network structure. At each training iterationk ,wck
is updated by averaging the gradients ▽W learned by a mini-
batch of training examples zi sampled from a domain dataset
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Table 1: General categorization of different deep transfer learning paradigms and their respective leakage profiles. Without
loss of generality, we assume a semi-honest threat model with attacker to be the target domain dataset owner. Three types of
transfer learning paradigms require different information interactions and training strategies, thus pose different potential
leakage profiles and may suffer from different inference attacks.
Categorization Brief Description Training Leakage InferenceStrategy Profile Attack Type
Model-based Model fine-tuning, i.e., continue training on the target domain. Self-training
〈
MS
〉
Membership
Mapping-based Hidden representations alignment, i.e., reducing distribution divergence. Co-training
〈
hS ,hT
〉
Property
Parameter-based Jointly updating shared partial network, i.e., hard parameter sharing. Co-training ⟨wc ⟩ Batch property
(either source or target). In such an alternating process,wck
has to be revealed across domains at each iteration k ∈
[1, 2, ...,K]. Thus, the potential leakage profile
〈
wck
〉
contains
all the intermediatewck during the training process.
As a summary, in this paper, we focus on inferring information
that is unintentionally disclosed by the data transmission between
the source and target domains, such as membership information of
an individual sample and property information of a specific sample
or a subset of samples (see more details in the next subsection.).
3.4 Inference Attacks for Deep Transfer
Learning
Inference attacks against deep learning models generally exploit im-
plicit memorization in the models to recover sensitive information
from the training data. Previously studies have proven that informa-
tion can be inferred from the leakage profile, such as membership
information that decides whether a sample is used for training
[14, 20, 22, 32, 36], properties which reveals certain data characteris-
tics, or reconstructed feature values of the private training records.
In this part, to empirically evaluate the privacy leakage in dif-
ferent transfer learning settings (shown in Figure 1), we present
concrete attack methods for each setting. Note, we assume the at-
tacker to be the owner of the target dataset for all the three transfer
learning paradigms discussed above.
Model-based. As illustrated in Table 1, the only leakage source in
this setting is the model trained using data from the source domain.
For simplicity, we denote the trained model as MS : y = fSw (x),
where y is the prediction label. According to the training protocol
in the model-based setting, the attacker can obtain the white-box ac-
cess ofMS , i.e., its structure and parameters. Thus, based on recent
works [19, 22, 26, 30, 32], an attacker can design powerful mem-
bership attack methods to detect sensitive information contained
in the source domain (i.e., membership attack). In the context of
membership attack, the goal of the attacker is to train amembership
predictor, which can take a given sample x as input and output the
probability distribution that indicates whether the given sample
is used for training the source domain model MS . Formally, we
denote the membership predictor as Amem : x ,MS → {P(m =
1|x), P(m = 0|x)}. Here,m = 1 means the given input x is used for
training the modelMS .
In this paper, we employ a widely used technique named shadow
model training for building the membership predictor. Specifically,
we assume the attacker can have extra knowledge about the source
datasetDS . The extra prior knowledge in our setting is the shadow
training dataset Dshadow that comes from the same underlying
distribution as DS for training the source model. The core idea of
the shadow training dataset is to first train multiple shadow models
that mimic the behavior of the source model. Then, the attacker
can extract useful features from the shadow models/datasets and
build a machine learning model that characterizes the relationship
between the extracted features and the membership information.
To be specific, the attacker first evenly divides the shadow train-
ing datasetDshadow into two disjoint datasetsDtrainshadow andDoutshadow .
Then the attacker trains the shadow model that has the same archi-
tecture as the source model usingDshadow . Subsequently, features
of samples from bothDtrainshadow andDoutshadow can be extracted. For
each sample in Dshadow , the attacker can use the output predic-
tion vector of the shadow model as the feature following the prior
work [32]. And each feature vector is labeled with 1 (member, if
the sample is in Dtrainshadow ) or 0 (non-member, if the sample is in
Doutshadow ). At last, all the feature-label pairs are used for training
the membership predictor.
Once the membership predictor is obtained, we can use it to
predict the membership label of a sample in DS , i.e., feeding the
output vector of the source domain model to the predictor.
Mapping-based. In the mapping-based setting, information leak-
age can be both posed at the source and target domains since the
training protocol proceeds in an interactive manner. To keep the
analysis consistency, we refer the attacker to be the owner of the
target domain dataset.
The core idea of the mapping-based method is to align the hidden
features extracted from the source and target domains, i.e., reducing
the discrepancy between feature distributions of these two domains.
This can be done by minimizing some pre-defined alignment loss
function (e.g., maximum mean discrepancy[17, 18, 25, 29]). Thus,
this method will lead to the hidden features of the source domain
share a similar distribution to the features of the target domain,
which comes with a strong privacy implication, i.e., the attacker can
leverage the feature similarity to build the attack model to detect
sensitive information contained in the source domain.
We consider the property attack [7] in this setting. At a high level,
the property attack aims to infer whether a feature comes from the
source domain has a specific property or not. Here, we take the
case of the k-th iteration as an example. Given a specific property,
the attacker can first collect an auxiliary dataset for assisting the
attack. Specifically, the attacker divides the target domain dataset
DT into two subsets, namely, DTprop which contains samples with
the property and DTnonprop which consists of samples without the
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Algorithm 1: Property Attack
1 Inputs:
2 Model parameterswk (on target domain)
3 Auxiliary datasets: DTprop and DTnonprop
4 Outputs:
5 Property Predictor Aprop
6 Pprop ← []
7 Pnonprop ← []
8 for each sample s in DTprop do
9 Calculate the hidden feature hTk
10 Append {hTk , 1} to Pprop
11 end
12 for each sample s in DTnonprop do
13 Calculate the hidden feature hTk of s
14 Append {hTk , 0} to Pnonprop
15 end
16 Train Aprop using Pprop ∪ Pnonprop
17 return Aprop
property. Subsequently, DTprop and DTnonprop are used as the aux-
iliary datasets for building the attack model. At the k-th iteration,
given the current parameter wk of the model trained using the
target dataset, the attacker calculates the hidden features hTk of
the alignment layer k with respect to the samples in the auxiliary
dataset. Hidden features are labeled with 1 if the corresponding
sample is in DTprop and 0 if the sample is in DTnonprop . Once the
attacker collects all the feature-label pairs, she can train a prop-
erty predictor Aprop using these pairs. The whole procedure is
demonstrated in Algorithm 1.
Based on the property predictor obtained above, the attacker can
conduct an online attack. Specifically, in the joint training process,
at the beginning of the k-th iteration, the attacker receives a batch
of hidden features hSk from the source domain. Then, the attacker
can employ Aprop to predict the property information contained
in the source domain dataset.
Parameter-based. In the parameter-based setting, information
leakage is posed by the weight parameter interaction between the
source and target domains. Similar to previous settings, we refer
the attacker to be the owner of the dataset of the target domain.
We consider the batch property attack in this setting. The intu-
ition behind this attack is that the attacker can observe the updates
of the share layers calculated using a mini-batch of samples from
the source domain. Thus the attacker can train a batch property
predictor Abprop to infer whether the update based on the mini-
batch with a given property or not. We take the k-th iteration as
an example to demonstrate how the attacker conducts the attack.
We assume that the attacker has auxiliary dataset Daux consisting
of samples from the distribution that is similar to the source do-
main distribution. Note that, this assumption is commonly used
in various previous works [23, 31]. Given a specific property, the
attacker can further divide Daux into two sub-datasets, namely, the
dataset which has the property (Dauxprop ) and the dataset without the
property (Dauxnonprop ).
Algorithm 2: Batch Property Attack
1 Inputs:
2 Model parameterswk of the shared partial network
3 Auxiliary datasets: Dauxprop and Dauxnonprop
4 Sample size: Lprop , Lnonprop
5 Outputs:
6 Batch Property Predictor Abprop
7 Pprop ← []
8 Pnonprop ← []
9 for l=1 to Lprop do
10 Sample mini-batch bprop from Dauxprop
11 Calculate the gradient дprop
12 Append {дprop , 1} to Pprop
13 end
14 for l=1 to Lnonprop do
15 Sample mini-batch bnonprop from Dauxnonprop
16 Calculate the gradient дnonprop
17 Append {дnonprop , 0} to Pnonprop
18 end
19 Train Abprop using Pprop ∪ Pnonprop
20 return Abprop
Based on the above setting, at the k-th iteration, the attacker can
receive the fresh parameterwk of the shared layer which is updated
based on samples from the source dataset. Then, the attacker can
calculate gradients дprop using the mini-batch sampled fromDauxprop
andдnonprop based on samples fromDauxnonprop . The batch gradients
based on Dauxprop are labeled with 1 and others are labeled with 0.
Based on these gradient-label pairs, we can train the batch property
predictor Abprop . The whole procedure is shown in Algorithm 2.
Once Abprop is obtained, the attacker can use it to predict the
btach property information of the source domain. Specifically, the
attacker first generates the gradient дonline based on the parame-
ters of the current and last iteration (i.e.,wk andwk−1). Then she
can feed дonline to Abprop to obtain the prediction result.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically study the potential information leak-
ages in deep transfer learning. We start by describing the datasets
and the experimental setup. We then discuss in detail the results for
various inference attacks under the aforementioned three transfer
learning settings, followed by the examination of viable defenses.
4.1 Datasets and Experimental Setup
We conduct experiments on two public and one industry datasets,
i.e., Review, UCI-Adult, and Marketing. The Review dataset is used
to examine membership attack as fine-tuning methods are often
used in such NLP task and typically suffer from membership infer-
ence. While the UCI-Adult dataset has some sensitive properties,
thus is used for conducting property based attacks. Besides, the
Marketing dataset is sampled from real-world marketing campaigns
to examine the defense solution. Data statistics are in Table 2.
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Table 2: Data statistics and tasks used for experiment.
Dataset Statistics Task
Amazon Review Electronics: #354,301 Review QualityWatches: #9,737 Prediction
UCI Adult
Source Train: #29,170
Source Test: #14,662 Census Income
Target Train: #3391 Prediction
Target Test: #1619
Marketing Source: #236,542 Coupon AdoptionTarget: #140,964 Prediction
Review.We construct our dataset from the public available Amazon
review data [21], with two categories of products selected, i.e.,
‘Watches’ and ‘Electronics. In our transfer learning setting, the
data-abundant domain ‘Electronics’ is viewed as the source domain,
while the data-insufficient domain ‘Watches’ is treated as the target.
Each sample consists of a quality score and a review text.
Following the literature on this task [3], we adopt the TextCNN
[12] as the base model for textual representation in the transfer
learning model. For TextCNN, we set the filter windows as 2,3,4,5
with 128 feature maps each. The max sequence length is set as 60
for the task. We initialize the embedding lookup table with pre-train
word embedding from GloVe with embedding dimension set as 300.
The batch sizes for training the source domain model, the shadow
model, and the attack model are set as 64.
UCI-Adult.We consider a secondAdult Census Income dataset [13]
from the UC Irvine repository to examine the property attack is-
sues. The dataset has 14 properties such as country, age, work-class,
education, etc. To form the transfer learning datasets, we use data
instances with country of “U.S.” as source domain and “non-U.S.”
as the target. For the UCI dataset, we consider an MLP as our base
model for the transfer learning models.
Marketing. For transfer learning purpose, two sets of data are sam-
pled from two real-world marketing campaigns data that contains
user profile, behaviour features and adoptions. One data-abundant
campaign is used as source domain, while the other is used as the
target. The task is to predict whether a user will adopt the coupon.
Implementation Details. Specifically, for model-based setting, a
fine-tuning approach is adopted where both the source domain
model and the shadow model employed the same model structure,
i.e., the above-mentioned TextCNN structure, followed by an MLP
layer of size 128. The attack model adopted is an MLP with network
of [16, 8]. For the mapping-based setting, we consider an MLP
with a network structure of [64, 8] for source and target models,
an MMD metric is used as the alignment loss between the two
domains, and another MLP with network of [64, 8] for the attack
model. For parameter-based setting, we consider a fully-shared
model structure with an MLP as the base model with structure of
[64, 8] at the task training stage, and another MLP with network of
[16, 8] for the attack model.
All the above neural network based transfer learning models
are implemented with TensorFlow and trained with NVIDIA Tesla
P100 GPU using Adam optimizer, if not specified. The learning rate
is set as 0.001. The activation function is set as ReLU.
Table 3: Membership attack for model-base settings.
Train Acc Test Acc Attack AUC Attack Prec.
10 epoch 0.9290 0.7182 0.5014 0.4705
20 epoch 0.9338 0.8648 0.7355 0.5868
30 epoch 0.9589 0.8563 0.6744 0.5832
For all the settings, we use Area Under Curve (AUC) to eval-
uate the overall attack performance. For membership attack, we
also adopt precision for evaluation, as membership of the training
dataset is the concern. Precision is defined as the fraction of samples
predicted as members are indeed members of the training data. For
property attacks, we further include accuracy for evaluating the
overall attack performance.
4.2 Model-based Setting
In the model-based setting, the attacker has the full white-box ac-
cess to the source model, thus the attacker is able to train shadow
models to mimic the behavior of the source domain mode. In this
setting, we explore the possibility of performing membership infer-
ence on the source model. Despite the context differences, mem-
bership attacks for model-based transfer learning models can be
conducted the same way as for any trained stand-alone deep learn-
ing models[23, 30, 32].
To build the membership predictor introduced in Section 3, we
split the original source dataset into three parts, namely, training
dataset (248,011 samples), test dataset (70,860 samples), and shadow
dataset (70,860 samples). We set the number of shadow models to 3.
Table 3 shows the training and testing accuracy for the attack clas-
sifier on the shadow dataset and the attack performance, i.e., AUC
and precision, on the source domain model. Smaller gaps between
training and testing accuracy suggests better generalization and
predictive power of the attack classifier. Overall, we find that even
in the model-based setting without direct interactions between the
source and target domains during the training process, the source
domain model does leak a considerable amount of membership
information. We also examine the effect of over-fitting by adjust-
ing the number of epoch trained for both the source domain and
shadow models. We observe the more over-fitted a model, the more
information can be potentially leaked. However, it decreases when
the number of epochs furthers increases. This echos the findings
in [32] that over-fitting is an important factor but not the only
factor that contributes to the leakage of membership information.
4.3 Mapping-based Setting
We then investigate property attacks under the mapping-based
transfer learning setting to infer the properties of the source domain
data during the training process. The properties are not the same
as the prediction label, or even independent of the prediction task.
To examine this, we construct two more datasets based on the UCI
adult dataset: Prop-race and Prop-sex, discussed as follows.
• Prop-sex: we filter out the property “sex” feature from the
input features in UCI-Adult data and use it as the attack task
label. The attack label is set as 1 if the property “sex” is male
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Table 4: Property attack on “sex” for mapping-base settings.
Prop-sex Test Attack Attack Prec.AUC Acc AUC male female
2 epoch 0.8513 0.8011 0.7357 0.7010 0.5918
5 epoch 0.8522 0.8101 0.7435 0.7072 0.6077
10 epoch 0.8650 0.8171 0.7766 0.7132 0.5883
Table 5: Property attack on “race” formapping-base settings.
Prop-race Test Attack Attack Prec.AUC Acc AUC white non-white
2 epoch 0.7640 0.8000 0.5661 0.8812 0.1652
5 epoch 0.7680 0.8012 0.5815 0.8914 0.1845
10 epoch 0.7750 0.8010 0.5885 0.8901 0.2179
Table 6: The Pearson correlation between the main predic-
tion task and the property label vs. property attack results.
Correlation Attack AUC Attack Acc
Prop-race -0.0837 0.5885 0.5646
Prop-sex -0.2146 0.7766 0.7059
and 0 otherwise. This is to examine whether a attacker can
infer training instance’s gender during the training process.
• Prop-race: similarly we filter out the “race” feature to study
whether this property appears in training instances. Attack
label is set as 1 if property “race” is white and 0 otherwise.
Table 4 shows the results of the property attack on the Prop-
sex dataset. The attack has a good AUC of 0.77 in the property
inference task, which shows the transfer learning setting does have
information leakage. The attack precision is high on the property
“sex:male”, and less satisfactory on “sex:female”. The female property
has much less instances and thus may be harder to be predicted.
We have also conducted experiments on another property “race”
in Table 5, the attack AUC is lower than on Prop-sex, 0.5885 vs.
0.7766. These results demonstrate that Prop-sex leaks more prop-
erty information than Prop-race in terms of attack AUC. At the
first glance, “race: white” has much higher attack precision than
“race:non-white”, 0.8901 vs. 0.2179. Close examination shows “race:
white” dominates the training data with around 80% label coverage.
We further examine the correlation between the chosen proper-
ties and the underlying Census Income prediction task, and com-
pare it with the property attack results in Table 6. In general, both
Prop-race and Prop-sex have information leakage issues, and the
property with a higher negative/positive correlation with the main
prediction task tends to cause higher potential information leakage.
4.4 Parameter-based Setting
For the parameter-based setting, we further process the UCI adult
data to perform the batch property attack. Again we use these two
properties “race” and “sex” and form two datasets namely BProp-
race and BProp-sex respectively. For both datasets, we set the batch
size as 8. For each batch in BProp-race, we set the label as 1 if a batch
has at least one data instance containing the “non-white” property
Table 7: Batch property attack data statistics.
Source data size Target data size
Positive Negative Positive Negative
BProp-race 38 528 2225 2637
BProp-sex 65 501 418 4444
Table 8: Batch property attack for parameter-based settings.
Test Attack
AUC Acc AUC Acc
BProp-race 0.8466 0.8054 0.5545 0.5372
BProp-sex 0.8577 0.8331 0.5654 0.9140
and 0 otherwise. For BProp-sex, we set the label as 1 if a batch has at
least one instance containing the “female” property and 0 otherwise.
The data statistics are shown in Table 7. We find for BProp-race, the
positive instance ratio in the source domain is drastically different
from the target, this may bring negative transfer. While for the
BProp-sex, the positive instance ratio is similar for both domains.
As shown in Algorithm 2, the selection of Daux is the key to
building the batch property predictor. In this paper, we directly
use the target dataset as the auxiliary dataset and find it works in
practice, as both domains commonly are related for the transfer-
ring purpose. Generally, we can obtain better attack performance
if we can use part of source domain samples to form the auxiliary
dataset. The results are presented in Table 8. First, we find the at-
tack AUC for the batch property attack in the parameter-based
setting are generally not as high as those from the property attack
in the mapping-based setting. The AUC is around 0.56 in batch
property attack, while up to 0.77 for property attack. This shows
the parameter-based setting is generally less vulnerable from at-
tacks, which can possibly be justified by the fact that the gradients
exchanged have been averaged at the batch-level. Second, the re-
sults for BProp-sex are better than BProp-race, as AUC results are
0.5654 and 0.5545 respectively. This is intuitive as observed from
Table 7, the domain difference in BProp-race is larger than the
BProp-sex. The model performance in BProp-race may suffer from
the negative transfer learning due to the domain gap, thus may lead
to the decrease in attack performance. Overall, the parameter-based
method is possible to suffer from batch property attacks, however,
the information leakage problem is not that severe.
4.5 Defense Solutions
A standard way to prevent statistical information leakage is differ-
ential privacy. However, the privacy guarantee provided by differ-
ential privacy comes with the decreasing of the model utility. Some
recent works proposed to relax the requirement of differential pri-
vacy to prevent membership/property attacks while provide better
model utility. For example, some regularization techniques such as
dropout are helpful to prevent the information leakage of machine
learning models [23, 36]. Recent studies consider to use Stochas-
tic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) [24, 36]. In this paper, to
prevent the information leakage in deep transfer learning, we em-
ploy SGLD as our optimizer to optimize deep models and show
its effectiveness in reducing information leakage. Prior work [36]
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Table 9: A comparison of defenses for property attack.
Prop-sex Prop-race
AUCTask AUCAttack AUCTask AUCAttack
Original 0.8466 0.7766 0.7750 0.5885
SGLD 0.8501 0.6862 0.8012 0.5442
DP-SGD 0.7662 0.6656 0.7192 0.5172
Dropout-0.1 0.7449 0.7126 0.7748 0.6040
Dropout-0.5 0.5881 0.6132 0.6194 0.5199
Dropout-0.9 0.5240 0.5188 0.5267 0.5041
demonstrates that SGLD is effective in preventing membership in-
formation leakage and provides theoretical bounds for membership
privacy loss. Empirically, in this paper, SGLD is also effective for
preventing the leakage of the property information while provides
comparable model performance compared with those non-private
training methods.
To examine the effectiveness of the defense solutions, we con-
duct experiments under the mapping-based setting. Specifically,
we replace the non-private optimizer (i.e., SGD) with SGLD and
train the source and target models from scratch. The overall result
is shown in Table 9. We observe that the use of SGLD can prevent
the information leakage of the training dataset, based on the above
attack metrics for evaluating the information leakage. In contrast to
the original optimizer, SGLD significantly reduces the attack AUC
score of the inference attack from 0.7766 to 0.6862 in Prop-sex, and
0.5885 to 0.5442 in Prop-race, while achieves better model utility
in terms of the task AUC score especially in Prop-race (0.7750 to
0.8012). In both datasets, SGLD achieves the best task AUC and
slightly outperforms the original task results. We infer the boost of
the task AUC score is due to the regularization effect of the noises
injected in SGLD, which can prevent model overfitting as pointed
out in the previous works [24, 36].
We also conduct experiments of DP-SGD introduced in the prior
work [1]. As the result shows, although DP-SGD can achieve better
anti-attack ability than SGLD, it comes with considerably model
utility decrease (the task AUC score decreases from 0.8466 to 0.7662
in Prop-sex, and 0.7750 to 0.7192 in Prop-race ). Furthermore, ex-
periments on Dropout are also performed. We can observe that
Dropout can also prevent privacy leakage. We also note that when
the drop ratio increases, the anti-attack ability of Dropout increases
but model utility decreases drastically. As a conclusion, through
experiments, we found that SGLD can be a good alternative to dif-
ferentially private optimization methods and it can achieve a better
trade-off between model utility and anti-attack ability.
5 INDUSTRIAL APPLICATION
Witness the effectiveness of the SGLD, we conduct additional exper-
iments to examine whether it is able to prevent information leakage
in an industrial application. The main task is to predict whether
a user will use the coupon and the inference task is to predict the
property âĂĲmarital status: marriedâĂİ (the Pearson correlation
between these labels is -0.03986). Follow the original application,
here we adopt a fully-shared model [15] under the parameter-based
setting. As shown in Table 10, we find the original TL method does
help to improve the target domain performance, boosting AUC
from 0.7513 (Target-only) to 0.7704. However it also suffers from
information leakage with an attack AUC of 0.5553. By combining
SGLD with transfer learning, with a minor decrease of task perfor-
mance (-0.8%), the information leakage can be significantly reduced
by 3.8%.
Table 10: A comparison of defenses for batch property attack
on the “Marketing” dataset in terms of AUC.
Target Original Defense
only TL Attack TL+SGLD Attack
AUC 0.7513 0.7704 0.5553 0.7625(-0.8%) 0.5176(-3.8%)
6 RELATEDWORK
Deep Transfer LearningModels.With the success of deep learn-
ing, deep transfer learning has been widely adopted in various ap-
plications [25, 27, 35]. According to our categorization based on
the potential information leakage, transfer learning models can be
summarized into three types, i.e., model-based, mapping-based, and
parameter-based, or a hybrid of the different types[18].
Model-based methods, such as model fine-tuning, generally first
pre-train a model using the source domain data and then con-
tinue training on the target domain data[4, 10, 11]. Mapping-based
methods aim to align the hidden representations by explicitly re-
ducing the marginal/conditional distribution divergence between
source and target domains which are measured by some distribu-
tion difference metrics. Commonly used metrics include variants of
Maximum Mean Discrepancy(MMD), Kullback-Leibler Divergence,
Wasserstein distance, and etc [17, 18, 25, 29, 35]. Parameter-based
methods transfer knowledge by jointly updating a shared network
to learn domain-invariant features across domains, which is mainly
achieved by parameter sharing [15, 38, 39]. Further works improve
parameter-based methods by incorporating adversarial training to
better learn domain-invariant shared representations [15].
There are few studies [16, 31] for analyzing privacy leakages
for general machine learning models or in a federated learning set-
ting, however, there is no such privacy analysis work for transfer
learning models. To bridge this gap, we first provide a general cate-
gorization of deep transfer learning models based on information
leakage types and conduct thorough privacy analysis through build-
ing specific attacks against different transfer learning paradigms.
We we also examine several general defense solutions to alleviate
information leakage for the three paradigms. The privacy preserv-
ing models for transfer learning are rarely studied. Prior work [16]
proposed a secure transfer learning algorithm under the mapping-
based setting, where homomorphic encryption was adopted to
ensure privacy at the expenses of efficiency and some model utility
loss due to the Taylor approximation. A follow-up work in [31]
further enhanced the security and efficient for the same problem
setting by using Secret Sharing technique. A recent work by [8] em-
ployed a privacy preserving logistic regression with ϵ-differential
privacy guarantee under a hypothesis transfer learning setting.
Membership Inference. The study [32] developed the first mem-
bership attack against machine learningmodels with only black-box
access using a shallow training method. This method assumes that
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we have some prior knowledge of the data for training the attack
classifier is from the same distribution as the original training data.
Later study of [19] followed the idea of shallow training and ex-
plored two more targeted membership attacks, i.e., frequency-based
and distance-based. The study[30] further relaxed key attack as-
sumptions of [32] and demonstrated more applicable attacks. Aside
from the black-box setting, these studies [22, 26] examined the
membership attacks against federated/collaborative learning under
the white-box setting, where an adversary can access the model and
potentially is able to observe/eavesdrop the intermediate computa-
tions at hidden layers. They share a similar idea that leverages the
gradients or model snapshots to produce the labeled examples for
training a binary membership classifier. This work [9] presented the
firstmembership attacks on both black-box andwhite-box for gener-
ative models, in particular generative adversarial networks (GANs).
Property Inference. Property attack aims to infer the properties
hold for the whole or certain subsets of the training data. Prior
works [2, 6, 7] studied property inference attacks that characterize
the entire training dataset. A property attack was developed [7]
based on the concept of permutation invariance for fully connected
neural networks, with the assumption that adversary has white-box
knowledge. Concurrently, the study [22] developed attacks under
the collaborative learning setting, where they focus on inferring
properties for single batches of training inputs.
7 CONCLUSION
In this study, we provide a general categorization of different deep
transfer learning paradigms depending on how the domains inter-
act with each other. Based on that, we then analyze their respective
privacy leakage profiles, design different attack models for each
paradigm and provide potential solutions to prevent these threats.
Extensive experiments have been conducted to examine the poten-
tial privacy leakage and effectiveness of defense solutions.
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